Codesa 1

The Convention for a Democratic South Africa (Codesa) first convened on 21 December 1991 at the World Trade Centre in Johannesburg. More than 220 delegates from 19 political parties attended and vowed their commitment to negotiations by signing the "Declaration of Intent" for an interim Constitution, committing all parties to a united, democratic, non-racial, and non-sexist state.

Though violence in the country still raged, this step was seen with much optimism, laying the foundations for more sustained deliberations, created by five working groups expected to continue into 1992.

15 May 1992 - Codesa 2

De Klerk delayed the second round of negotiations by calling for a whites-only referendum to seek support for the continuation of negotiations. The majority of whites voted in favour.

Codesa 2 began, but the negotiations soon broke down due to disagreements over the key issues of constitutional principles.

Negotiations collapsed and no talks were held for a few months. Escalating violence led to the Boipatong Massacre in June, where the government was blamed for 42 deaths. There was also a massacre in Bisho in September, where 29 protesters died. Parties had stopped talking to each other as dismay filled the public discourse.

By August, negotiators tried to get talks back on track.

10 April 1993: Chris Hani assassination

One of the liberation movement's most high-profile leaders and a senior member of the negotiations, enigmatic SACP general-secretary Chris Hani was assassinated by radical right-wing Polish immigrant Janusz Walus. This threatened to derail negotiations and force South Africa into civil war. Hani stood with Mandela- the two most popular liberation movement leaders.

Conservative Party MP Clive Derby-Lewis was also linked to the assassination, however, debate continues to rage as the masterminds behind the killing and Walus' hitlist, which included Mandela and Mac Maharaj, were never convicted.  

In Johannesburg and Pretoria, at least 80 people were killed and hundreds injured in violence directly related to Hani's assassination.

In the days that followed, pressure mounted on the apartheid government and the ANC to get negotiations on track but to also make sure justice is served for Hani's death. ANC negotiators eventually pushed for a definitive election date and the formation of the transitional executive council to govern the country until then. These key points, which were agreed to, helped cool an incendiary moment in the run-up to democracy.

27 April 1994 still marks an unbelievable moment in the history of our country. White domination that had existed for 342 years came to an end at midnight on 26 April, and the new country was born a second later. I clearly remember the hoisting of the new flag at the Union Buildings that symbolised the birth of the new nation. It was the moment of liberation for all who lived in South Africa.   

I recall the excitement and anxiety. It was the end of four challenging years of talks, dialogue, and negotiations. Of continuing conflict, violence, breakdowns, and walkouts. Of settlement and securing lasting peace. Of South Africans embracing each other in the realisation that we can live together in peace.

The elections started that morning. The long queues that formed at polling stations now replaced all doubts and concerns for the worst. This was the moment when South Africans wanted to show support for the change. It was a plebiscite on the new Constitution. 

The period that followed was equally exciting. The inauguration of President Mandela on 10 May 1994 and the establishment of the new democratic government were historic milestones. I was fortunate enough to remain close to the scene. My new responsibility was to help install the constitutional structures created. Much of it was completely new, inter alia, provinces that came into existence.

A few memories from that period come to mind. We, who served in the Government of National Unity, had the firm intention of making the project successful. We shared ownership of what we created in the new Constitution. We succeeded in bringing the nation together under the leadership of President Mandela. We had our differences, but the national interest was overriding. We had a machine that supported the changes and was effective in the execution of its duties.

A golden period

Today, I so much wish we could re-live those years of the beginning of our democracy. It was a golden period and globally, South Africa was the darling for years.

However, I can recall during debates amongst ourselves, there was always a view that the Constitution could not singularly guarantee the country's well-being. We had to realise democracy would deliver its highs and lows, from inception onwards. Much depends on who democracy produces as leaders. Through our democracy’s leaders, we have lived through countless highs and lows.

Many (including myself) would now say it’s time for a new high. South Africa is not a failed state, but the state is failing its citizens. If this is true, how do we rebuild the state? The state consists of three important components: the political sphere, including government; the private sector sphere; and civil society in all its magnitude of activity.

In the past, we witnessed what could be achieved through cooperation and collaboration between all these spheres. Through pressure and interaction, it collectively brought down apartheid. It created the vision and agreement for the future when it was most necessary. There was a very critical moment during our negotiations which I will never forget. We had to ask what it was that we wanted from the future instead of what it was that we wanted to protect from the past. That question became a pivotal moment.

I feel we are at a similar point now. Probably, the majority of South Africans, through the different components that represent them, would like to unite in their effort. The centre of our society is stronger than the factions seeking divisions. National interest will prevail over self-interest. Democratic values will override populism and opportunism.

It is however critical that these good intentions be implemented and executed. It requires:      

• Strong, effective, and firm leadership at government level;
• A capable state consisting of civil servants who can deliver the services expected of them;
• A private sector that is always mindful of the greater good and not own interest or sense of greed;
• A citizenry that lives in harmony with their own goals and those of others.

My appeal would be that we mobilise towards these goals. We did it at the birth of our democracy. Why not now? One of the successes of the peaceful transition was precisely the fact that there were more leaders and citizens in the centre than on the fringes. Leaders and citizens who joined hands despite their differences, for the love of our country. That unity enabled us to halt the destructive efforts from both the left and right.

The Government of National Unity was a remarkable concept. It was a practical example of how South Africans can unify. That was achieved under more challenging circumstances than we are facing now. It remains a tragic mistake that it was brought to an early end. However, the valuable lessons of collaboration and cooperation remain. In my view, those lessons could be applied with resounding success today.

South Africans are exceptional in their endeavours to find answers and solutions when a way out seems impossible. Our transition from apartheid to democracy remains a benchmark in the world. A way out from the current circumstances is not unthinkable. Let us forever remember the spirit of Madiba, in his own words: 

As I walked out the door toward the gate that would lead to my freedom, I know if I didn't leave my bitterness and hatred behind I would still be in prison.

- Roelf Meyer was the Chief Negotiator for the National Party Government during Codesa.

"There's a huge question arising over when and which government in this past 30 years stopped the prosecution of people who committed atrocities during apartheid," says Mac Maharaj.

He was one of ANC's main negotiators during the democratic transition and, in the four years of transition, he went from underground operative, terrorist and prisoner to negotiator, joint secretary of the Transitional Executive Council and writer of the Interim Constitution.

He adds:

I'm as much guilty. I think it's atrocious that we stopped prosecutions.

Earlier this year, former president Thabo Mbeki denied court findings that his administration interfered in the prosecution of apartheid crimes and that his executive prevented prosecutors from pursuing cases that were referred to the National Prosecuting Authority (NPA) by the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC). However, Karyn Maughn writes that evidence contradicts Mbeki.

A number of prosecutors testified that they had been subjected to political pressure by key Mbeki administration officials not to pursue TRC cases. In 2021, the Supreme Court of Appeal confirmed that there was undisputed evidence from the NPA that, between 2003 and 2017, "the executive adopted a policy position" that apartheid atrocity cases recommended for prosecution by the TRC would not be pursued. 

Maharaj doesn't mention Mbeki or any other president's name when talking to News24 about amnesty. Instead, he turns his attention to himself. 

"The last time I was tortured was in 1990," he says, sitting on the patio of his home in Johannesburg. The sun is setting, and streaks of golden light play on his face. Greys have gone white, his pocked face has become gaunt and yet, at 89, he is still sharp, witty and inquisitorial.

But, there seems to be some residual disappointment that the halted TRC prosecutions have sparked within him.

Clandestine meeting with his torturers 

In March 1994, he says he got a call at 23:00 from Mo Shaik – "who I knew from the intelligence structure" – who asked for a meeting in Pretoria at 01:00. He recalls his wife, Zarina, saying this might be the trap, "and he's the bait. But what do I do, he's a comrade."

So, on a dark autumn morning, he drives to the capital and when he meets Shaik, his comrade passes him and whispers "follow me". They walk through side streets before climbing a fire escape into a small room.

Inside, there are tables set up in the middle of the room to make one long table. Behind them are 12 "civilian-dressed white men" and the two chairs opposite.

As he sits down and asks what this is all about, the first man to his left lifts his briefcase, opens it and pulls out a VHS tape that explodes when you put it into a machine. The next one is a laser-sighted pistol. And so, all 12 men open briefcases and reveal deadly weapons before one of them says: "We have captured this from the white right wing."

Maharaj responds: "Okay, so what?"

The men say: 

We have come to tell you that we are giving an undertaking to do everything in our power to make sure that the elections take place peacefully. There cannot be any disturbance, even from the white right wing.

Confused, Maharaj asks why he is being told this, to which the men reply that Nelson Mandela trusts him, so if he is tasked with telling Mandela that there are people working to ensure a peaceful election, maybe the ANC leader will believe him – and them.

He pointed out that there were men at the table who had tortured him before, and they replied that this was why they thought Mandela would believe him.

He doesn't tell Mandela about this incident because "I don't know what they mean by this; they have not asked for anything in return. So, let me watch this situation."

Over time, he forgets about this incident, but one day in the new democratic dispensation, when Maharaj is minister of transport, he reads an article which reports that "a group of whites have been granted amnesty, and among them are the names of the chaps who tortured me and were at that meeting".

In the present, his voice slightly raised, he says: "It says there [in the newspaper that] these people were given amnesty for assaulting Mac in detention. So, torture is reduced to assault."

Back in history, the amnesty committee does not call him for the white men's TRC hearing. He gets angry.

Eventually, he calms himself and says: "What the f*** are you doing, Mac? It's over, get down to the job of governing this country. The fact that these guys who tortured you got indemnity … they did ensure that elections took place."

Sellouts and compromises 

Maharaj says he is learning now that "this thing of stopping prosecutions was unacceptable".

"But it falls into the category of the mistakes of omission and commission in the way we governed the country," he says.

He adds that South Africa's problem is that each time you look back over the past 30 years, "it becomes a debate on who to blame. The significance of the mistake and how to correct it is lost."

Maharaj doesn't buy into the narrative that the ANC sold out and compromised.

"You ask: What was the compromise? And you have difficulty getting answers."

Amid discussions about the economy, land and various other governance decisions, he says:

The negotiated solution, at its centre, was the question of making sure that power went into the hands of one person, one vote. That was the thinking of that era.

Maharaj says that during the multi-party negotiations, three questions proved contentious: How the government would be constituted; how Cabinet decisions were to be voted on; and amnesty.

Regarding the first one, he says the compromise was "that we would tolerate a convergent coalition to lead us to the demand that we have always made as a liberation movement: Majority rule based on one person, one vote."

The second and third questions proved much trickier to negotiate. Eventually, after much back-and-forth, it seemed that if the question of amnesty could be resolved, the rest would fall into place.

'Amnesty for peace'

Maharaj says he and Fanie van der Merwe, his co-secretary in the negotiations from the nationalist side, were then tasked with resolving these deadlocks.

Between the two of them, the post-amble of the Interim Constitution was drafted – who exactly drafted it is a matter of debate, Maharaj says. Van der Merwe died in March last year.

Whenever the two met alone, Maharaj says Van der Merwe was concerned about the armed and security forces not voting, and that the nationalist government had been to meetings where members were worried about what would happen to them after the elections.

Van der Merwe wanted a blanket amnesty, Maharaj said no. So, they discussed and draft the post-amble.

Some have described this unique provision as "amnesty for peace, [a step that] was necessary for the achievement of the 1994 transition in , despite the undoubted complexity of the motives surrounding the eventual agreement to it". 

Maharaj states: 

There is just one sentence in it there that turned the tables. It says there shall be amnesty, in terms of a law to be passed by the newly elected democratic government.

This eventually turned out to be the TRC.

Wisdom of hindsight

Maharaj says he accepted this deal when he took it to chief negotiator Cyril Ramaphosa. He told Ramaphosa that he wanted the phrase "may be amnesty", but that proved to be a no-go, so he hinged the "shall" on the fact that the new government would determine how amnesty would be granted.

"When I look back now, I say we made some mistakes in drafting that law because of the  consequences."

He says the structure of the TRC had three committees that respectively dealt with human rights violations, reparations and amnesty.

"We allowed them to operate these three things as separate silos. So, what you said at the truth commission was not what was put when you applied for amnesty."

This created a problem where some people were granted full amnesty after withholding the whole truth about all the crimes they committed.

"That's not the basis from which we wanted it," Maharaj says of the spirit of the post-amble and the TRC law.

He says, a little deflated: 

But then I go and read the law. We did allow the law to be interpreted as individual acts. That's the wisdom of hindsight.

Maharaj echoes the points made by the late Desmond Tutu when he complied the final TRC report.

"We saw a moral equivalence in the atrocities on both sides. But that did not mean there was a legal equivalence," he says.

Maharaj, who remains a member of the ANC but is retired from active politics, says he has serious concerns about what will happen after the 29 May elections.

"I very much fear that whichever form of coalition [will happen] if the ANC is below 50%, we will have entered an era of coalition politics in South Africa, which is completely governed by opportunism. It will have nothing to do with what to deliver to the people."

The former uMkhonto weSizwe leader says a revolutionary can never be a pessimist, so he remains optimistic that the values of addressing injustices, promoting multiracialism, fighting for equality and fighting sexis while allowing for unity and diversity in building democracy can be achieved, as enshrined in the Constitution.     

Thirty years later, it is worth reflecting on how our democracy was founded and what lessons could be learnt from the pre-1994 process. Some of these lessons may be relevant for a post-2024 election period, and the inevitable coalition forming that lies ahead. 

Codesa (Convention for a Democratic South Africa) lasted only about seven months before it deadlocked in June 1992. The reasons for its failure are manifold. There were substantive issues on which the parties could not agree at that stage, such as the nature of the transition, the percentage needed to change the future Constitution, the form of state and the protection of minorities. The parties also did not yet trust each other enough. 

There were, however, also structural and process reasons why Codesa failed. The structure of the five working groups and the absence of a central negotiating body were unworkable. The size of the working groups (almost 80 people per working group) was too large to do any serious negotiation. The process that was followed in the working groups was geared towards grandstanding and not compromise – especially with the media present. 

Not skilled 

There was also a total lack of compromise-seeking and deadlock-breaking mechanisms. The working groups consisted entirely of politicians, with no technical expertise or input provided for. The politicians were simply not yet skilled and mature enough to make the process work. 

The overall administration of Codesa was perceived as party-political, with only the three biggest parties partaking in it (until the IFP left the process, after which only the ANC and SA government ran it). There was a small non-partisan secretariat (performed by the Consultative Business Movement – CBM), but it reported to the politicians heading the administration.

These flaws did not in themselves make Codesa fail, but did not facilitate its success either. They became lessons to be heeded when the next round of negotiations was due to start. That indeed happened when the Multiparty Negotiation Process (MPNP) was set up in February 1993. This resulted in the MPNP negotiating an interim Constitution in nine months, despite several setbacks, such as Chris Hani's assassination in April 1993, the walkout of the IFP and the so-called Concerned South Africans Group in June 1993, as well as the AWB breaking into the venue in June 1993. 

Several factors contributed to the MPNP's success. Smaller technical working committees, with impartial experts and advisors nominated by the parties, were established. Detailed work done was in these technical committees, who brought (mostly consensus) reports through a Planning Committee (consisting of eight politicians) to the Negotiating Council, who either adopted it or referred it back.  

The Negotiating Council had rotating chairs from a pre-agreed multiparty panel, and was open to the media and diplomatic liaison officers for the sake of transparency. After major breakthroughs or meaningful progress, media conferences were held, first jointly and then as parties on their own. This enabled parties to manage their constituencies. 

Deadlock-breaking mechanisms were created. Often an informal committee of two, consisting of Fanie van der Merwe (DG of the government’s Department of Constitutional Affairs) and Mac Maharaj (ANC leader) would facilitate this. Very serious deadlocks were taken to a "bosberaad" of the two major parties. However difficult to believe today, the ANC and NP government (especially in the persons of Cyril Ramaphosa and Roelf Meyer) viewed themselves as custodians of the process and formed a "process alliance". 

'Oiling the wheels' 

In this time, opportunities to build trust and cultivate personal relationships were found, and the politicians grew more sensitive about and skilled in managing the process. All of this was supported by an impartial and objective administration and secretariat (CBM), almost "oiling the wheels". 

The MPNP adopted the interim constitution on 17 November 1993, paving the way for the elections of 27 April 1994, ushering in a new democratic dispensation. 

Which of the lessons learnt and processes adopted could be useful to political parties post the 2024 elections? At present, by law, parties have only two weeks to choose partners and negotiate the nature and terms of their coalition agreements. In most European democracies, a period of three months is allowed. 

First and foremost, potential coalition partners must be clear about their own objectives, but also work towards common objectives. Without the latter, no coalition agreement would last. Once agreed upon, an eye should continuously be kept on the ultimate goal despite the inevitable setbacks.

Even though the negotiating period is infinitely shorter than in the nineties, it is important to agree on "rules of engagement" quickly - probably within days. This should include agreement on how the process would work and what the flow of decisions would be. If there are more than two parties involved, the way decisions are taken also becomes important, whether by consensus or majority vote. The MPNP used the term "sufficient consensus", which meant enough parties should agree to take the process forward. In addition, parties should up front up agree on deadlock-breaking mechanisms, especially because time is short. 

Too short a negotiation period 

The choice of the venue might seem unimportant, but if the bigger party merely issues a "summons" to smaller parties to come to its offices, it is not a good start to build mutual respect and trust. An agreed independent venue is always better.

While coalitions are a fairly new phenomenon in South Africa, parties should probably get technical input from the few experts in that area before the election. The negotiating period is too short to make technical experts part of the process, but they could be consulted while the process is ongoing. 

Codesa learned the hard way: you cannot negotiate in public, but you must at the same time ensure a degree of transparency necessary to build public trust in the coalition-making process.

The MPNP used self-imposed deadlines constructively, such as the agreed election date. In the coalition process, the deadline is clear: two weeks. But even then, it may be important to set mutually agreed deadlines inside that period. It would also be useful to break down the "big issues" in smaller constituent parts. 

In all negotiations, it is sometimes necessary to use what was called "constructive ambiguity" in the MPNP process. To use a key term that could be interpreted a little wider, could lead to agreements that otherwise might not be possible. 

In the end, there is one factor that political parties would not have time to develop, and that is the maturity and wisdom of the negotiators. Whether party leaders and senior negotiators will have enough of this to reach an agreement in time will only be seen by the middle of June 2024. 

Perhaps a good dose of true patriotism and the interests of all South Africans would not be a bad idea.

- Theuns Eloff is an independent commentator and the former head of administration at the MPNP.

In the 30th year of democracy, the Constitution remains the stable centre of South Africa.

It is often referred to as the supreme law. But it is much more. It is the manifesto of our nation. It is the charter of our freedom. 

It serves as the mirror we use to judge ourselves. It is the standard we expect those in political and economic power to respect. It is the ultimate weapon of the poor, the weak and the disadvantaged. It is the window through which the nation looks at the future we want. 

The Constitution is used every day by citizens to speak truth to power. But how is it that this modest document became so enduring and so central to daily discourse?

The Constitution's deep legitimacy 

The deep legitimacy enjoyed by the Constitution is in no small way the product of the process of its making.

The founding fathers and mothers of our nation were of the view that how the Constitution is created, who writes it and who decides on it was crucial to whether or not the nation as a whole will own it at that time and for generations to come. It is thus that the Constitution was not drafted behind the backs or above the heads of the people.

The Constitutional Assembly, composed of 490 members, was chosen by the 20 million people who voted in the remarkable 1994 elections.

The 490 came from every corner of South Africa, representing every racial and language group and all religious backgrounds. They represented the full diversity of South Africa. Just look at the names of the members, and you will see every corner of South Africa, all political persuasions, and all religions. You will see among them young and old. You will see among them women and men.

Nothing in secret

Every single meeting of the Constitutional Assembly (CA) was held in full view. The public and media were allowed to attend all meetings, discussions and debates. Nothing was done in secret.

From the moment of its election, the Constitutional Assembly understood that the writing of the final Constitution had to be genuinely participatory if it was to be credible.

The Constitutional Assembly launched the largest-ever public participation campaign to date. The Constitutional Assembly asked the citizens to send in their thoughts. A staggering 1 753 424 submissions were received!

Discussions were held on radio and TV on an almost daily basis.

Members of the Constitutional Assembly did another remarkable thing. They travelled the country to speak to the citizens where they were. Public meetings were held in town halls, churches and schools at which citizens were able to speak to the CA members about their wishes directly.

When the new Constitution was finally voted upon, it was supported by an overwhelming majority in the CA. (As a matter of interest, only two members - less than 0.5% - voted against). 

The making of a nation

It can comfortably be said that our Constitution was genuinely the making of the nation. The Constitution remains South Africa's stable centre because it genuinely captures the nation's hope and aspirations. It is both of the people and for the people.

After 300 years of slavery, colonialism and apartheid, the Constitution gives us the right to choose our own government. The people can freely choose their own government. That's big!

In May, this is exactly what the nation will be doing. The right to vote was a central demand of the great South African Freedom Struggle.

The Constitution remains the flame of our democracy. It secures basic human rights, provides avenues to hold the state accountable, and creates the enabling conditions for a society based on human dignity, equality and freedom.

The Constitution serves as the instrument through which South Africans assert their rights. It serves as an instrument to transform our society from an unequal and unfair one, to one that is more equal and fair.

The Constitution asserts the inherent dignity of all. It is a weapon in the hands of the underdog, of the racially discriminated against, of the economically marginalised, of the women who are subjected to patriarchy and for the protection of children.

The Constitution is our weapon for protecting and deepening our democracy – for assisting us in achieving the dream that no government rules without the consent of the people.

Over the past decades, it has withstood robust debate and scrutiny - by the way, this is something the Constitution itself encourages.

Thirty years after the start of democracy, the Constitution continues to serve as the pride of our nation.

- Valli Moosa was one of the architects of the Constitution. He served as Minister of Constitutional Development in President Mandela's cabinet. He is currently the Chairperson of We The People.

At its first meeting after the 1994 democratic elections, Cosatu's Central Executive committee (CEC) reflected on the outcome and concluded that while the polls represented a fundamental break with the past, in that political power now vested with the people, the event did not on its own signify progress as yet.

The struggle was not just about the Constitution, regular elections, a new flag and other national symbols. It was about the political, social and economic power.

It would take many years and continuous commitment of the democratic government working with organised labour and other progressive organisations to painstakingly turn the promises in the interim Constitution, the reconstruction and development programme (RDP) and the ANC's elections manifesto into reality.

We cautioned about the notion of an elected government having to deliver to the people. This was just the beginning of another chapter of the struggle that required the same participation by the masses. You cannot win on the table what you couldn't win in the streets - something communities now realise, hence the constant protests for water, sanitation, roads and access to quality and affordable public health and education.

Push for a two-thirds majority

When the National Party insisted on a 70% majority for the adoption of the new Constitution by the Constitutional Assembly, we took to the streets. We told employers in no uncertain terms that we would bring the country to a standstill unless they got the regime to accept the internationally recognised norm of a two-thirds majority.

Cosatu took the same position when employers insisted on entrenching the lockout clause in the Constitution. Even as we lost on the property clause as the ANC and the South African Communist Party (SACP) joined hands with the rest of the political parties at the Convention for a Democractic South Africa (Codesa), save for the Pan Africanist Congress (PAC), in arguing it would not hinder land reform, we soldiered on till the last day of the adoption of the final Constitution. History has absolved us as the ANC is now chasing its tail trying to find a solution that it rejected in 1996.

Some in the ANC felt we were rocking the boat with constant mass action, but we couldn't be bothered. No one was going to impose an unfavourable outcome without our consent.

I can boldly claim that the negotiated outcome is as much the result of Codesa as it is of the masses taking to the streets demanding to be heard.

Fighting for workers' rights

While we were engaged in the struggle for political, social and economic emancipation, we were first and foremost a trade union federation concerned with the rights of workers, something the apartheid regime had denied black workers for decades.

We decided to strike while the iron was still hot and approached Tito Mboweni, the new Minister of Labour, with several labour laws to consider. Indeed, workers can look back at that period, proud that a combination of political will by the minister, the department and mass action resulted in the enactment of the Labour Relations Act, entrenchment of the right to strike in the Constitution, Basic Conditions of Employment Act, Occupational Health and Safety Act, Mines Health and Safety Act, Skills Development Act and the Employment Equity Act.

As we mark 30 years of freedom and democracy, it is unfortunate that we are also amid election campaigns, making it difficult to have a rational assessment of what has been achieved, what has failed and the reasons (objective and subjective) for this. We also need to consider what needs to be done in the medium term and not wait for another 30 years to once more make promises to improve the lot of our people and the country. For the ANC and its allies, the cup will be half full, if not three-quarters full, while many of its detractors will see an empty cup.

It is an open secret that I'm very critical of the ANC.
I, however, do not belong to the school of thought that attributes our current situation to the Codesa outcomes. Neither do I parrot the notion of little having changed.

Objectively, rapid progress has been made in certain areas, but there has been slow or no movement at all in others. In certain areas, we have regressed to the level of apartheid years.

The majority of workers enjoy rights that were enacted during the early years of democracy. That some workers feel let down by the unions is because of corrupt leaders who are in it for themselves and weak structures on the ground.

Successes and challenges 

The majority of communities now have access to health and education. While many receive quality health and education, others still spend a whole day waiting to be served in hospitals due to poor work ethic, inadequate numbers of health workers, lack of medication and equipment. 

Same with education. In several provinces, the teacher-pupil ratio is above the norm, making it difficult for educators to give special attention to learners who struggle with certain subjects.

Many rural communities and informal settlements, long denied electricity under apartheid, now have access to electricity, water and sanitation. The same communities that celebrate these milestones, are like others who previously had access to electricity, now subjected to constant blackouts due, in part, to the hollowing out of Eskom, looting of resources and incompetent management whose sole purpose was to enable state capture.

Similarly, on access to shelter, water and sanitation, roads and public transport. Strides made thus far get cancelled by poor maintenance, inadequate planning and continued apartheid spatial development, which places many people away from work opportunities and, in some parts of the country, leads to migration. 

We have woefully failed when it comes to the integration of public transport in the form of Metrorail, buses and taxis. It is hoped that the mooted devolution of Metrorail to provinces such as Gauteng, the Western Cape, KZN and the Eastern Cape may result in the interconnected, integrated, intermodal and inter-nodal of public transport.

If there is one area that we have struggled with as a country, it is economic growth that creates jobs, absorbs new entrants and draws rural areas and certain urban centres to the mainstream of the economy. This remains a ticking time bomb, especially as women and youth remain excluded. 

A committed government is needed 

Many in this category blame the Codesa agreements for the situation when it is the lack of political will by our elected leadership that should be blamed. The initial growth seen between 1998 and 2008 has petered out in part due to lack of investment in social and economic infrastructure, state capture under Jacob Zuma's administration and the hollowing out of Eskom, Transnet and Prasa.

Similarly, corruption has become endemic owing to the destruction of the National Prosecuting Authority, the Scorpions, and our intelligence structures. Crime continues to rise, especially gender-based violence, despite the rhetoric of the government. 

Many challenges remain, especially poverty, unemployment and inequality. They're not insurmountable.

All that is required is a government that is committed to implementing policies that result in social and economic transformation. Policies that result in sustainable economic growth to absorb new entrants to the labour market are also needed, as well as a government where fraud, corruption and maladministration has consequences, regardless of the person involved and their station in life. Then and only then can we proudly say we are a true democracy. 

May we not wait for the next 30 years to reach our nirvana. Till then, singer Letta Mbuli's Not Yet Uhuru should be the alternative national anthem.

- Mbhazima Shilowa is a former general-secretary of Cosatu. He was part of the ANC and SACP negotiating team at Codesa.